Wednesday, December 01, 2010

Why Hard Left is Hurt by WikiLeaks Attack on State Dept.

James Rubin explains in The New Republic why the State Dept is so vulnerable. This author is the husband of shrewish anti-American bitch Christiane Amanpour, a harridan and fishwife of the first water. But he makes sense here:
There’s no question that many of the Wikileaks documents are a great read. These diplomatic conversations between American officials and leaders from the Arab world, China, and Europe provide important insights about the subtleties of U.S. policy and the complexities of dealing with different personalities and governments around the world. But the disclosures are not just interesting; they are also ironic. That’s because they undermine the very worldview that Julian Assange and his colleagues at Wikileaks almost certainly support.

By and large, the hard left in America and around the world would prefer to see the peaceful resolution of disputes rather than the use of military force. World peace, however, is a lot harder to achieve if the U.S. State Department is cut off at the knees. And that is exactly what this mass revelation of documents is going to do. The essential tool of State Department diplomacy is trust between American officials and their foreign counterparts. Unlike the Pentagon which has military forces, or the Treasury Department which has financial tools, the State Department functions mainly by winning the trust of foreign officials, sharing information, and persuading. Those discussions have to be confidential to be successful. Destroying confidentiality means destroying diplomacy.

This is not to say there isn’t an important place for quality journalism that may, at times, rely on sensitive diplomatic exchanges or that seeks particular information through leaks. Without such journalism, the American public would have never known about the abuses at Abu Ghraib or the electronic surveillance programs of the National Security Agency that became rightly controversial during the Bush administration. In those cases, there was a higher principle at stake than protecting the secrecy of diplomatic exchanges. Government-sponsored torture or domestic spying on U.S. citizens without legal oversight are profound questions of policy that merit substantial public knowledge. But, in the undifferentiated mass disclosure of diplomatic conversations, there is no higher principle to merit damaging the foundations of American diplomacy.

Quality journalism and the NSA electronic surveillance programs are not worthy to be in the same sentence without a negative particle. There is no evidence that the US was prying into the privacy of people who weren't in contact with known terrorist e-mail and telephonic contacts in Pakistan and elsewhere. Rubin is as giddy as his foolish spouse in this respect.
Fortunately, there is little or no discussion in the cables, as yet, of the Middle East peace process. Would the supporters of Wikileaks want secret Middle East diplomacy to promote peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis to be made public, too? Do they have any understanding of how difficult it is for Israeli and Palestinian leaders to make the compromises necessary for peace under the glare of public pressure? My guess is the special envoy for President Obama, former Senator George Mitchell, has created a separate reporting channel for his discussions with Arab and Israeli leaders, outside the normal State Department diplomatic channels. But had he not done so, there is every reason to believe that Wikileaks would have dumped that information, along with the other 250,000 cables. Would the likely outcome of such disclosures—the imperiling of the peace process—really have been something that accorded with the left’s professed goals in the Middle East?

If Mitchell put the Middle East negotiating points on a back channel communications grid, it was certainly a bit of wise foresight. There are as many voyeurs in the State Dept. up in the Secretariat as anywhere, I found out in my decade-plus sojourn as an FSO working in Foggy Bottom.
There’s another irony here, too. The Wikileaks document dump, unlike the Pentagon Papers in the 1970s, shows that American private communication with foreign leaders by and large reflects the same sentiments offered by U.S. officials in public. There is no grand conspiracy, no grand hypocrisy to uncover and expose. The big hypocrisies here are not being perpetrated by Americans; they are being perpetrated by foreign governments, namely non-democratic ones.

Yet those on the hard left are usually the loudest critics of America imposing its own values, its own way of doing business, and its own culture on other countries. For better or worse, in many parts of the world there’s a big difference between what government officials are prepared to do publicly and what they’re prepared to say and do privately. We may wish it otherwise, but those are the realities faced by U.S. officials. The hard left, so quick to demand that America accept other countries’ political systems, now seems blind to the fact that other governments want to have the right to say one thing in public and a different thing in private. By respecting that difference, American diplomats are doing their job. Surely the Obama administration, like the Bush administration before it, would prefer for Arab leaders to be as honest and open and transparent as we are in our country. Until such democratic values come to the Arab world, however, we have to work with what we’ve got. U.S. diplomacy has been damaged, not destroyed; it will recover after a time. But for now, Wikileaks is making diplomacy’s task a whole lot harder.

When I was working as a diplomat in France, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, the government officials I interacted with were constantly asking what the "real" story was behind such and such a policy or statement. This was during the Kissinger era, in part, so suspicions of Old World duplicity weren't entirely unfounded. I constantly amazed them when I insisted that there was NOT a two-track diplomacy going on and that American officials, rather than being master conspirators, were even more at the mercy of events than certain foreign dictators, who could often bend recalcitrant citizens to their will by sheer force---
Saddam Hussein was the largest example, though the moronic fool Qaddafi, whose name is Libyan slang for "camel vomit," I was told by Hume Horan, an expert in Libyan dialect, certainly deserved his moniker.

Assange is a publicity whore whose megalomania is probably an untreated borderline personality disorder. Anyone who lionizes this womanizing freak should be exposed to his arrant nonsense non-stop, as he prates on about world peace and bringing down American diplomacy while cavorting as a working-class hero to moronic leftoids unworthy of breathing in a free world atmosphere.
Here is a comment I made on The Washington Note by Steve Clemons re: Brzezinski's comments on Wikileaks.
@DonBacon "The Arab countries have made it clear that they are primarily concerned with Israel's real nukes and not Iran's nonexistent ones, and the Arab people would welcome Iran nukes as shown in a recent poll."

Which "recent poll" would that be, Don? I lived and worked in the Middle East as an State Dept. trained Arabist for five years and I found that from Lebanon through Saudi to Egypt, the Iranians were first and foremost regarded as heretic Shi'ites rather than fellow Muslims.

Secondly, not to put too fine a point on it, in hundreds and perhaps over a thousand official interactions with Arab diplomats, I personally not once encountered any concern, even rhetorical, over Israel's possession, real or imagined, of the bomb. Even on two occasions when I served as translator between Crown Prince Abdullah and the US Ambassador. The Saudis had many concerns about Israel and the Palestinians, but none that the bomb would be used against them. Indeed, the US actually sold the Saudis a Cray supercomputer that the Israelis complained was off-limits to Israeli government and even civilian use.

Finally, I would very much be interested in the poll you assert showed Arab lack of concern over an Iranian bomb and fear of an Israeli bomb.

And for a different and much more "realistic" take on the Arab view of Iran and the bomb, Wigwag's 1:05PM note is appropriate. And the leaders in this case, with the possible exception of the Shi'ite majority island of Bahrain, reflect fully the views of their people.

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