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Hezbollah's position is no more secure in the broader Arab world, where it is seen as an Iranian tool rather than as the vanguard of a new Nahdha (Awakening), as the Western media claim. To be sure, it is still powerful because it has guns, money and support from Iran, Syria and Hate America International Inc. But the list of prominent Arab writers, both Shiite and Sunni, who have exposed Hezbollah for what it is--a Khomeinist Trojan horse--would be too long for a single article. They are beginning to lift the veil and reveal what really happened in Lebanon.
Having lost more than 500 of its fighters, and with almost all of its medium-range missiles destroyed, Hezbollah may find it hard to sustain its claim of victory. "Hezbollah won the propaganda war because many in the West wanted it to win as a means of settling score with the United States," says Egyptian columnist Ali al-Ibrahim. "But the Arabs have become wise enough to know TV victory from real victory."
Yes, the Arab media actually are beginning to outpace the gullible international left media cabal, always susceptible to anti-US and anti-Israeli legerdemain, in sophistication and foreign policy sagacity. The Arab media understands that Hezbollah is not even a majority among SHI'ITE political parties in Lebanon, despite huge subventions from Iran via Syria to buy votes and media support. The largely mythical "Arab Street" quoted by western media would actually favor a permanent peace with an Israel integrated into the region, but agitprop organs of the ultra left such as BBC and the US phalanx led by Pravda on the Hudson search out and give wide coverage to inflammatory hotheads one can find anywhere and then declare sententiously that that is near-unanimous Arab opinion. Taheri notes that the Hezbo-Emperor has no clothes inside Lebanon itself, which face another civil-war threat:
A claim of victory was Hezbollah's shield against criticism of a strategy that had led Lebanon into war without the knowledge of its government and people. Mr. Nasrallah alluded to this in television appearances, calling on those who criticized him for having triggered the war to shut up because "a great strategic victory" had been won.
The tactic worked for a day or two. However, it did not silence the critics, who have become louder in recent days. The leaders of the March 14 movement, which has a majority in the Lebanese Parliament and government, have demanded an investigation into the circumstances that led to the war, a roundabout way of accusing Hezbollah of having provoked the tragedy. Prime Minister Fuad Siniora has made it clear that he would not allow Hezbollah to continue as a state within the state. Even Michel Aoun, a maverick Christian leader and tactical ally of Hezbollah, has called for the Shiite militia to disband.
Indeed, the flood of possibly counterfeited US dollars to victims of the Israeli bombings of Shi'ite neighborhoods in South Beirut buys little:
Mr. Nasrallah followed his claim of victory with what is known as the "Green Flood"(Al-sayl al-akhdhar). This refers to the massive amounts of crisp U.S. dollar notes that Hezbollah is distributing among Shiites in Beirut and the south. The dollars from Iran are ferried to Beirut via Syria and distributed through networks of militants. Anyone who can prove that his home was damaged in the war receives $12,000, a tidy sum in wartorn Lebanon.
The Green Flood has been unleashed to silence criticism of Mr. Nasrallah and his masters in Tehran. But the trick does not seem to be working. "If Hezbollah won a victory, it was a Pyrrhic one," says Walid Abi-Mershed, a leading Lebanese columnist. "They made Lebanon pay too high a price--for which they must be held accountable."
Indeed, Nasrullah might have instigated the kidnappings because he was losing credibility and loyalty within Hezbollah itself! And his slavish subservience to Iran's politicized Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic's less-than-universally-admired poster boy for an "Islamic Republic," has not won Nasrullah admiration among fellow Shi'ites:
Before he provoked the war, Mr. Nasrallah faced growing criticism not only from the Shiite community, but also from within Hezbollah. Some in the political wing expressed dissatisfaction with his overreliance on the movement's military and security apparatus. Speaking on condition of anonymity, they described Mr. Nasrallah's style as "Stalinist" and pointed to the fact that the party's leadership council (shura) has not held a full session in five years. Mr. Nasrallah took all the major decisions after clearing them with his Iranian and Syrian contacts, and made sure that, on official visits to Tehran, he alone would meet Iran's "Supreme Guide," Ali Khamenei.
Mr. Nasrallah justified his style by claiming that involving too many people in decision-making could allow "the Zionist enemy" to infiltrate the movement. Once he had received the Iranian green light to provoke the war, Mr. Nasrallah acted without informing even the two Hezbollah ministers in the Siniora cabinet or the 12 Hezbollah members of the Lebanese Parliament.
Mr. Nasrallah was also criticized for his acknowledgement of Ali Khamenei as Marjaa al-Taqlid (Source of Emulation), the highest theological authority in Shiism. Highlighting his bay'aah (allegiance), Mr. Nasrallah kisses the man's hand each time they meet. Many Lebanese Shiites resent this because Mr. Khamenei, a powerful politician but a lightweight in theological terms, is not recognized as Marjaa al-Taqlid in Iran itself. The overwhelming majority of Lebanese Shiites regard Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, in Iraq, or Ayatollah Muhammad-Hussein Fadhlallah, in Beirut, as their "Source of Emulation."
Some Lebanese Shiites also question Mr. Nasrallah's strategy of opposing Prime Minister Siniora's "Project for Peace," and instead advancing an Iranian-backed "Project of Defiance." The coalition led by Mr. Siniora wants to build Lebanon into a haven of peace in the heart of a turbulent region. His critics dismiss this as a plan "to create a larger Monaco." Mr. Nasrallah's "Project of Defiance," however, is aimed at turning Lebanon into the frontline of Iranian defenses in a war of civilizations between Islam (led by Tehran) and the "infidel," under American leadership. "The choice is between the beach and the bunker," says Lebanese scholar Nadim Shehadeh. There is evidence that a majority of Lebanese Shiites would prefer the beach.
When I lived there a quarter century ago, Lebanese Shi'ites were almost universally dirt-poor and marginalized---after the Civil War ended in 1990, however, a burgeoning middle class emerged among the downtrodden and impoverished Shia Lebanese:
There was a time when Shiites represented an underclass of dirt-poor peasants in the south and lumpen elements in Beirut. Over the past 30 years, however, that picture has changed. Money sent from Shiite immigrants in West Africa (where they dominate the diamond trade), and in the U.S. (especially Michigan), has helped create a prosperous middle class of Shiites more interested in the good life than martyrdom ? la Imam Hussain. This new Shiite bourgeoisie dreams of a place in the mainstream of Lebanese politics and hopes to use the community's demographic advantage as a springboard for national leadership. Hezbollah, unless it ceases to be an instrument of Iranian policies, cannot realize that dream.
The list of names of those who never endorsed Hezbollah, or who broke with it after its Iranian connections became too apparent, reads like a Who's Who of Lebanese Shiism. It includes, apart from the al-Amins, families such as the al-As'ad, the Osseiran, the al-Khalil, the Hamadah, the Murtadha, the Sharafeddin, the Fadhlallah, the Mussawis, the Hussainis, the Shamsuddin and the Ata'allahs.
Far from representing the Lebanese national consensus, Hezbollah is a sectarian group backed by a militia that is trained, armed and controlled by Iran. In the words of Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the Iranian daily Kayhan, "Hezbollah is 'Iran in Lebanon.' " In the 2004 municipal elections, Hezbollah won some 40% of the votes in the Shiite areas, the rest going to its rival Amal (Hope) movement and independent candidates. In last year's general election, Hezbollah won only 12 of the 27 seats allocated to Shiites in the 128-seat National Assembly--despite making alliances with Christian and Druze parties and spending vast sums of Iranian money to buy votes.
Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal and Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, owns [or owned] a string of gas stations in the Detroit area. While cunning and corrupt, Berri is by no means completely in Hezbo's pocket. Lebanese president Emile Lahoud is Syria's errand-boy and may pose more problems than Berri in reaching a national resolution of Lebanon's semi-permanent sectarian rifts. The western media's Hezbollatry, as Taheri noted, largely derives from Hate America cadres in the BBC and Manhattan/LA.
As Taheri was quoted above, Arab writers both of Sunni and Shi'ite origin are unmasking Hezbollah as an Iranian Trojan Horse, aided and abetted by Syria to get the Hariri assassination pushed into the background and to keep stick-insect Assad's chronic bumbling out of the spotlight.
So when reading or watching the western MSM Hezbollatry, bear in mind that Arab observers, even Shi'ites in Lebanon, are not buying into the BS.
For some very astute comments, check out The Astute Blogger who points out that Lebanese PM Siniora believes Hezbos henceforward will not be able to launch another operation from South Lebanon.
NRO's Corner stresses that Nasrullah did not inform the two Hezbo Ministers in the Siniora government or the twelve Hezbo members in the Lebanese Parliament. Nasrullah blithely blew off Hezbo protestations by citing security considerations concerning Israeli infiltrators!
Boy, that guy has huevos!
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