China & Russia: Diplomacy over Sanctions at UN?

The Security Council negotiations over a statement concerning economic sanctions if Iran refuses to forgo enriching uranium are now in jeopardy because of the joint Russia/China Permrep request for more diplomatic negotiations.

This effectively scuttles any strong UN resolution, as it appears that the Iranians will use the Russia/China negotiating ploy to continue secretly to enrich while talks go on and on. Two years of negotiating with the toothless Euro group resulted in a secret memo by a senior Iraqi security official explaining how gullible the Eurodupes were. This was commented upon during the Euro-twaddle sessions by any blogger with a dime's worth of gray matter. But the China/Russia move is much more serious and here's why:

First, in the late nineties, an obscure Russian official in Boris Yeltsin's circle wrote a "scientific paper" which explained why control of energy was the chief avenue for Russia to re-assert some control over its "near-abroad" and possibly farther afield.

The official's name was Vladimir Putin, and he is now President Putin putting his theories into action. If he can control Iranian energy exports even at second remove, he has another pawn on the chessboard of world energy security.

China also wishes Iran within its sphere of influence. Although further than India geographically, China is now dependent on secure oil import supplies and wants a friendly offshore producer that is not under another superpower's strong influence [read US influence] like the Saudis, Emirates, Iraq, and Kuwait.

So China and Russia, each for its own reasons, has very rational motives for keeping Iran relatively friendly toward their own needs and, in Russia's case, control of exports.

Russia is the largest holder of natural gas reserves in the world. The second largest holder in natural gas reserves in the world is Iran. Between the two countries, they hold over forty percent of the world's natural gas. Putin has already demonstrated, in his characteristically clumsy fashion, that he is willing to employ gas exports for political reasons. If Iran and Russia form a sort of gas condominium, the long-term possiblities become fascinating, if a bit sinister, to potential clients of Russian and Iranian gas [read Europe].

There is another, and less obvious, reason for Russia to improve relations with Iran. The Chechens of Chechniya are ethnically of Iranian origin and speak an Iranian-based dialect. Although the Chechens are Sunni Muslims, they may be susceptible to possible Iranian pressure, albeit indirect, to relax the insurgency against what they perceive as the Russian occupation of their lands. I doubt whether this is a major calculation, but it is one of those intangibles [Ossetians are also ethnically Iranian, in the scrambled ethnic mix of Caucasian populations.

So the reasons for Russia and China to cooperate on Iranian sanctions do not appear as important as reasons they may wish to allow Iran to continue its uranium enrichment.